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The game of baseball is amenable to a variety of strategies that affect short-term 
outcomes.  This paper employs regression analysis, simulation, and cognitive analysis of 
mental biases to analyze the strategic scenario known as the “Intentional Base-on-Balls” 
and proposes a model to explain that strategy and predict its effectiveness. 
The results of this study suggest that managers are prone to Type II errors, that is, 
issuing an Intentional Base-on-Ball in a situation where objective analysis suggests 
otherwise.  Results further suggest that the ratio of Type I errors to Type II errors is 
disproportional to the ratio of their respective costs.  This imbalance points to a 
subjective component to the decision-making process, one that can be explained by 
biases and cognitive errors. 
The results and model described in this paper may allow managers to avoid future 
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1.0 Introduction  
In major league baseball, there is an action called the intentional base-on-balls 
(IBB), whereby a manager will make a strategic decision to instruct his pitcher to 
intentionally impart four consecutive unhittable pitches rather than allow the opposing 
batter the opportunity to swing freely.  Also referred to as an intentional walk, the IBB is 
in theory a means of minimizing risk.  The walk is usually used in the three following 
situations.  1) In order to set up a force out when first base is open with a runner on 2nd or 
3rd base; 2) In a similar situation, to set up a double play; and 3) when the manager is 
afraid of the offensive potential of the current batter and would rather pitch to the 
subsequent batter.   
While the use of the Intentional Base-on-Ball has its merit, and is beneficial in a 
number of situations, it can be argued that managers have recently resorted to this tactic 
as a projection of a particular bias as opposed to a rational strategic decision.  For 
example, on June 22nd 2003, San Francisco Giant outfielder Barry Bonds was 
intentionally walked twice by the Florida Marlins with the bases empty, once with one 
out and once with two outs.  Although this is a rare occurrence, it leads one to question 
the motives of the manager.  Was he fearful of the offensive player, or was his faith in his 
pitcher so little that he would rather walk a batter than face him in a situation where only 
a home run would directly lead to a run scored?  Adding to the complexity of determining 
the answer is the fact that Barry Bonds, during that same 2003 season, hit a homerun only 
8.7% of his at-bats — roughly once every 11.5 chances. 
This paper will attempt to analyze the strategic decision-making process with 
respect to the IBB, and the biases inherent in that process.  In addition to these primary 
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concerns, the paper will attempt to confirm two hypotheses.  The first states that 
managers are tempted to offer an IBB in a situation where statistically it is not their most 
effective tactic. The second hypothesis states that managers are influenced by a number 
of biases and predispositions that will pressure them to vary from the normative model.  
These biases and predispositions include loss/risk aversion, incentive bias/agency 
problem, path dependence, confirmation bias/availability bias, regret theory/omission-
commission, and representativeness. 
The problem can be summarized in the following chart, which shows the four 
possible scenarios involving an IBB problem. 
 
Suggestion 
 Pitch Walk 




Walk C D 
 
 
Boxes ‘A’ and ‘D’ represent scenarios where the normative model and the 
manager’s decision agree.  In these situations, no biases are presumed to be inherent and 
little investigation needs to be conducted. 
The focus of this paper will be on Boxes ‘B’ and ‘C’.  Box ‘B’ represents a Type I 
error whereby the manager should have instructed the pitcher to intentionally walk the 
batter, but chose to order a pitch.  Box ‘C’ represents a Type II error whereby the 
manager should have instructed the pitcher to pitch, but chose to issue an IBB.  In these 
two situations, the normative model and the actions taken do not agree and are possibly 
influenced by a combination of biases. 
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I hypothesize that, in the case of IBB, Type II errors are more prevalent than Type 
I errors after taking into account the associated costs, or: 
 
Freq(Type II Errors)*Cost(Type II Errors) > Freq(Type I Errors)*Cost(Type I Errors) 
 
Quantifying the specific costs associated with each error may be difficult. 
However, should there be a dramatic variance between the frequency of each error,  I 
maintain that the ratio of costs could not possibly be that high.  For example, should the 
data suggest a 5:1 ratio between the frequencies of Type I errors versus Type II errors, a 
relative cost of 1:5 must exist to maintain balance.  Since this ratio is probably 
unrealistic, I will be able to assume that some tendency towards this type of error exists. 
This paper will analyze the strategic decision involved in an Intentional Base-on-Balls, 
review historical analysis of the Intentional Base-on-Balls, develop a normative model 
and discuss the biases inherent in the decision to stray from the normative model. 
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1.2 Scope of Analysis 
The scope of this project assumes that a number of variables are non-factors.  
Although this assumption may limit the conclusions, it discounts information that is not 
necessarily in the control of the players through whom the managers manage.   These 
factors include defensive fielding as well as stadium characteristics. 
 
1.2.1 Fielding 
Behind every pitcher stands eight defensive players whose role is to assist the 
pitcher.  It is reasonable to assume that certain players are better defensively than others.  
It may be reasonable to further assume that, at times, a defensive player will commit an 
error, or commit a spectacular play that cannot be predicted for the average player.  
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Errors, miscues, and exemplary play will lead to deviations from the normative model 
that may affect future results.  However, for the purpose of the present model, I will not 
consider errors and such.  This is a reasonable assumption, since managers cannot predict 
these actions, and hence managers should not be expected to take them into account when 
devising a strategy involving an IBB. 
 
1.2.2 Stadium Characteristics 
In 2004, major-league baseball had 30 teams, each playing in their own home 
stadium.  Stadiums are not cookie-cutter constructions; they come in different sizes, 
dimensions and even altitudes.  While the left-field fence at Boston’s Fenway Park 
measures at 334 feet, the left-field fence at Detroit’s Comerica Park measures at 402 feet.  
While New York’s Yankees Stadium is situated at sea level, Colorado’s Coors Field is 
one mile above sea level.  Stadium variance will affect a batter’s ability to get a hit or 
reach an additional base, thereby affecting the statistical relationship between pitchers 
and batters.  It has been calculated that a home run hit at Yankee Stadium traveling 400 
feet would travel 408 feet at Atlanta’s Turner Stadium and 440 feet at Coors Field.   
Similarly, while a ball hit 340 feet to left field of Comerica Park will be an out, at 
Fenway Park it would be a homerun.  Given the variation, stadium size and dimension 
will affect every relationship between a batter and a pitcher.  Due to the number of 
stadiums and the complex disparities between these stadiums, this paper will not consider 
their effect on the intentional-walk phenomenon in baseball.   
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2.0 The Strategic Decision involved in an Intentional Base-on-Balls 
In the article ‘An Analysis of the Intentional Base of Balls’, John F. Jarvis (1999) 
compiled two tables that he used to explain the use of the IBB.  Table 2.0a outlines the 
historical performance of all batters between 1980 and 1996, while Table 2.0b outlines 
the historical performance of all batters, whose at-bat directly followed that of an IBB 
during that same time period. 
 
Table 2.0a1: Hitting Summary for All At-Bats 
 BA SLG AB 
NL 0.257 0.383 1,048,080 
AL 0.264 0.405 1,184,055 
Total 0.261 0.395 2,232,135 
   Note: Inclusive of at-bats in Table 2.0b 
Table 2.0b: Hitting Summary for All At-Bats 
following an Intentional Base-on-Balls 
 BA SLG AB 
NL 0.241 0.356 18,177 
AL 0.261 0.394 15,012 
Total 0.250 0.373 33.189 
 
The above tables show that there appears to be an incentive to intentionally walk a 
batter since, on average, the subsequent batter has a reduced expected output level.  
While Table 2.0a shows a batting average of .261 or 26.1%, the hitters following an IBB 
have a batting average of .250 or 25%.   
However, the article also points to the fact that, in a typical at-bat, hitters gain 
approximately 0.09644 bases per at-bat, while hitters gain 0.11171 bases per at-bat 
following an IBB.  In light of this, it may be considered detrimental to offer an IBB.  This 
paper will attempt to understand the discrepant predictions. 
                                                
1 BA is the ratio of hits per at-bat.  SLG is the ratio of total bases per at-bat.  
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2.1 Historical Analysis of the Intentional Base-on-Balls 
Since there are 3 bases and runners can be on any or all of them, there are 8 
possible base combinations.  Given that a team can be in an inning with 0, 1 or 2 outs, 
there are thus 24 total configurations. Much of the analyses conducted on intentional 
base-on-balls relate to the probabilities associated with these 24 scenario configurations. 
Jarvis (1999) attempts to determine whether the expected future runs in a given 
scenario was increased due to an IBB by employing two distinct mathematical methods. 
The first is a historical comparison between actual and expected outcomes, and the 
second is a regression analysis between IBBs and actual runs. 
 
2.1.1 Historical Comparison between Actual and Expected Outcomes 
Jarvis is able to prove that by utilizing the IBB, managers were able to save 39 
runs over the 16,160 that were scored in the situations he analyzed.  Basing his study on 
observed historical records, Jarvis measured the expected future runs in each of the 24 
possible scenarios. 
 
Table 2.1.1a: Expected Future Runs 
Outs/Runners --- 1-- -2- 12- --3 1-3 -23 123 
0 0.492 0.872 1.21 1.487 1.363 1.744 1.982 2.310 
1 0.261 0.519 0.684 0.907 0.955 1.167 1.386 1.558 
2 0.098 0.224 0.327 0.439 0.375 0.501 0.595 0.763 
 
The table above indicates an overall trend of increasing expected runs, as (i) the 
number of  runners increase, and/or (ii) the number of  outs decrease.  This trend matches 
expectations since these conditions would generate increased opportunities.  However, 
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the trend would imply that it is never beneficial to intentionally walk a batter, as the 
expected future runs will always increase.  It is this point that indicates a limitation in the 
analysis of Jarvis, and begins to explain the theory extension this paper will propose. 
 Based on the probabilities of singles, doubles, triples, homeruns and outs from 
overall batter statistics during that same time period, as seen in Table 2.1.1b, Jarvis 
recalculated the expected future runs in each scenario. 
 
Table 2.1.1b: Aggregate Probabilities – Prof. Jarvis 
 BA SLG AB S D T HR TBB IBB HBYP
Overall 
Statistics 
0.261 0.395 2,232,135 409,542 102,963 14,172 55,676 215,272 20,638 13,795 
 
Table 2.1.1c: Expected Future Runs 
Outs/Runners --- 1-- -2- 12- --3 1-3 -23 123 
0 0.522 0.943 1.121 1.557 1.121 1.557 1.736 2.256 
1 0.283 0.568 0.738 1.035 0.738 1.035 1.205 1.585 
2 0.106 0.246 0.368 0.513 0.368 0.513 0.635 0.843 
 
 In order to properly calculate the number of runs that would have been scored 
should an IBB not have been imparted, Jarvis recalculated the expected future runs and 
weighted each hitter’s statistics based on the number of IBBs they received.  A hitter who 
received more IBBs would have his statistics weighted more heavily. 
 
Table 2.1.1d: Weighted Offensive Earned Run Average 
Outs/Runners --- 1-- -2- 12- --3 1-3 -23 123 
0 0.644 1.106 1.270 1.750 1.270 1.750 1.914 2.481 
1 0.353 0.670 0.832 1.164 0.832 1.164 1.326 1.748 
2 0.135 0.293 0.412 0.578 0.412 0.578 0.698 0.933 
 
Finally, using the available data concerning the number of times each of the 24 
scenarios has occurred, it is possible to measure the total number of runs that would have 
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been scored if an IBBs was not imparted. 
 
Table 2.1.1e: IBB Counts 
Outs/Runners --- 1-- -2- 12- --3 1-3 -23 123 
0 1 1 220 3 63 78 406 0 
1 1 11 3306 11 911 176 4140 0 
2 13 30 6428 24 1387 102 2483 0 
 
Using simple multiplication between the above two tables, a total of 16,160 runs 
would have been scored versus the 16,121 that were scored after issuing an IBB.  This 
provides a value of –0.003 runs per IBB, indicated that the strategy did save a few runs, 
indicating value in an IBB at the aggregate level. 
It should be noted that the above analysis speaks of the aggregate results of 
16,000+ scenarios disregarding the individual abilities and achievement of the key 
playmakers.  This analysis does not take the pitcher into account and is thus inadequate as 
a tool for proper decision-making.  The present paper will build on Jarvis’s results and 
propose a model that integrates individual player differences to create a tool that is 
adequate for better decision-making. 
 
2.1.2 Regression Analysis between Intentional Base-on-Balls and Actual Runs 
A second method of analysis is based on linear regression between offensive 
events and runs scored per single event.  Jarvis based his findings on 424 team-season 
records (424 *162 games) and 16,121 total runs scored between the 1980 and 1996 
seasons.  When we use 11 independent variables and runs as the dependent variable, the 
correlations look as follows: 
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Walk + Hit by Pitch 0.308 
Intentional Base-on-Balls 0.033 
Stolen Base 0.087 
Caught Stealing -0.238 
Ground into Double Play -0.429 
 
The value of 0.033 attributed to IBB means that every Intentional Base-on-Balls 
imparted led to an average of 0.033 runs.  This number is significantly lower than the 
coefficient attributed to any other positive offensive scenario including the categories hit 
by pitch (0.308) and single (0.439).  This indicates that an IBB leads to fewer runs than 
other offensive categories.  Using only this piece of information, it could be argued that 
an IBB would always be preferred.  This paper is an attempt to quantify argument by 
looking at hitter/pitcher head-to-head match-ups. 
One quantifiable value for an IBB can be illustrated by utilizing the aggregate 
results of Table 2.1.1b and Table 2.1.2a.  Table 2.1.1b documents the likelihood of each 
offensive outcome, while Table 2.1.2a indicates the projected runs associated with each 
offensive outcome.  By multiplying the results for the variables Outs, Singles, Doubles, 
Triples and Homeruns, it is possible to determine the aggregate projected runs expected 
per at-bat, that is, the projected runs associated with a single at-bat that does not result in 
an IBB.  This number can be compared to the projected runs associated with a single IBB 
(0.033).   
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The results of the multiplication is a project run value of 0.0421, meaning that a 
single at-bat that does not result in an IBB will lead on average to 0.0421 runs.  This 
value is greater than the 0.033 expected runs for a single IBB.  This result seems to 
validate the aggregate use of the IBB.  
 
2.2 The Normative Model Extension 
Although the above methods provide a good analysis of the effect of an IBB on 
future runs, such an analysis neglects two significant variables: the statistics of both the 
individual hitters and the statistics of the individual pitchers participating in this scenario.  
Knowing that an IBB was beneficial in an aggregate analysis is of little benefit to 
managers attempting to judge individual situations whose variables differ from that of the 
aggregate.  A manager may make one decision when there is one out and a runner on 
second and the batter is superstar Alex Rodriguez followed by weak-hitting Tony Clark.  
He may make a completely different decision in a scenario where weak-hitting Chris 
Woodward is followed by the superstar Carlos Delgado. 
The proposed normative model allows the user to input pre-specified data and 
receive an outputted decision stating whether it is beneficial to intentionally walk the 
batter in the given situation.  The model combines simulation and regression techniques.  
The development of the model required three key steps. These were: gathering raw data, 
testing data to determine historical relationships that predict future at-bat behavior and 




2.2.1 Raw Data 
The first step was gathering raw data to be used in the creation of mathematical 
relationships between historical statistics and projected outcomes.  The difficulty in this 
step was to eliminate unnecessary data from the complex web of baseball statistics.  
Since there were 540 batters in the 2004 season, with their participation ranging from 1 to 
690 at-bats, a reduced sample was necessary to limit those batters whose limited at-bats 
would skew the overall sample.  Such a skew would occur should a batter hit a home run 
in their only career at-bat against a given pitcher, especially if that pitcher is not known 
for giving up homeruns.  Using data from a 1994 data set, only those batters with greater 
than one thousand career at-bats were included.  Similarly, I used only the statistics of a 
reasonable sample of pitchers, those whose number of career at-bats faced was greater 
than one thousand,. 
Necessary information required for both hitters and for pitchers can be found in 
the following table: 
 
Table 2.2.1a – Information Required (A) 
For Batters For Pitchers 
At-Bats At-Bats Against 
Singles Singles Allowed 
Doubles Doubles Allowed 
Triples Triples Allowed 
Homeruns Homeruns Allowed 
Strikeouts Strikeouts Allowed 
Outs (less strikeouts) Outs (less strikeouts) Allowed 
Hit By Pitch Hit By Pitch Allowed 
Walks Walks Allowed 
 
The above data was gathered at CBS Sportsline.com’s baseball statistics section, 
where one is able to view career statistics on all active and retired players.  When 
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necessary, I employed more detailed data from the Retrosheet’s website, an official 
publication for Sabremetrics (the statistics of baseball) analysis. 
The above information was necessary to compute historical individual data.  
Further data was required to represent the head-to-head data between the pitcher and the 
hitter.  This information includes: 
 
Table 2.2.1b – Information Required (B) 







Head-to-Head Outs (less strikeouts) 
Head-to-Head Hit By Pitch 
Head-to-Head Walks 
 
I gathered head-to-head data from two primary sources.  The first source was a 
publication entitled Bill James Presents STATS 1994 Batter versus Pitcher Matchups, 
(1994). The publication breaks down every hitter versus pitcher match-up prior to the 
1994 season and surveys both active offensive and defensive players.  Secondary 
information was compiled from CBS Sportsline.com’s pitcher versus batter section.  This 
source provided updated information for the years 1995-2005. 
 
2.2.2 Simulation Data 
In the development of the model, I used raw data compiled from historical 
baseball statistics to develop a general probability equation, for each individual 




The third step involves the creation of a baseball simulator.  This will enable a 
user to input historical information and, based on the allotted probabilities, will perform a 
number of simulations to determine what would most likely occur throughout the 




3.0 Normative Model 
An important component of the simulation tool was the relationship between the 
individual batters and the individual pitchers when determining the at-bat outcome.  
Although much data is available on individual performance, it is the relationship between 
the performances of these individuals that matters most in the proposed simulation.  It 
would be extremely easy to record only the individual performance of a pitcher and/or 
batter and extrapolate as though outcomes were independent of second parties.  
Unfortunately, it is improbable that players of varying abilities will be as good in all 
situations.  Tom Hanrahan discusses this exact point in an article he published in 2001 
entitled Does Good Hitting Beat Good Pitching? Using a sample of all hitters who, 
between 1984 and 1996, had at least 446 at-bats, and all pitchers who, during the same 
period, faced at least 100 batters, Hanrahan was able to come up with the following table. 
 
Table 3.0a: American League Pitcher/Batter Performance 







Good Pitchers (opposing average less than .253) 
At Bats 93,137 106,936 81,393 281,466 
Hits 19,215 25,320 22,272 66,807 
Batting Average .2063 .2368 .2736 .2374 
Average Pitchers (opposing average between .253 and .283) 
At Bats 93,321 111,247 86,180 290,748 
Hits 21,995 29,988 26,020 78,003 
Batting Average .2357 .2696 .3019 .2683 
Poor Pitchers (opposing average greater than .283) 
At Bats 63,793 77,928 61,820 20,3541 
Hits 16,822 23,437 20,664 60,923 
Batting Average .2637 .3080 .3343 .2993 
All Pitchers 
At Bats 250,251 296,111 229,393 775,755 
Hits 58,032 78,745 68,956 205,733 
Batting Average .2319 .2659 .3006 .2652 
 
 Unsurprisingly, this table indicates that a pitcher will fare better against a poor 
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batter than a good batter and a batter will fare better against a poor pitcher than a good 
pitcher.  This necessitates the creation of a model that will quantify the relationship 
between an individual pitcher and an individual batter. 
One solution was developed by Dan Levitt (1999).  In this article, Levitt 
reintroduces an equation developed in 1983 by Bill James that attacks the same 
pitcher/batter relationship.  The equation not only determines the relationship between the 
ability of the hitter and the ability of the pitcher, it also normalizes that relationship 
against the league average.  The purpose of the equation is to determine the most likely 
future average between a batter and a pitcher.  The relationship James introduced, and 
tested against historical data, is the following: 
 
=  ________     (BatAvg*PitAvg)/(LgAvg)_________________ 




BatAvg = Batter’s average, shown as percentage of hits per official at-bats 
PitAvg = Aggregate batting average against a particular pitcher 
LgAvg = The aggregate league batting average 
 
Levitt (1999) tests the above equation against real-life data to see if the equation 
was still valid approximately 15 years after it was initially introduced.  Levitt’s results 
indicate that Bill James’s equation is not only still effective, but predicts behaviour within 
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only a few percentage points over 18 situations.  Table 3.0b shows a breakdown of 
Levitt’s analysis based on 1995 statistics. 
 
Table 3.0b: Summary – Batter versus Pitcher Matchups 
  All Batters Good Batters Average Batters Poor Batters 
  Actual Formula Actual Formula Actual Formula Actual Formula 
Pitchers: 
Good .250 .249 .276 .275 .251 .251 .223 .220 
Average .290 .290 .317 .319 .292 .293 .262 .259 
AL 
Poor .317 .325 .340 .356 .323 .328 .287 .291 
Pitcher 
Good .245 .247 .266 .274 .251 .247 .218 .219 
Average .284 .283 .314 .313 .280 .283 .259 .253 
NL 
Poor .317 .321 .351 .353 .322 .321 .279 .289 
 
By using the above equation, we can calculate projected batting averages for all 
present batter-versus-pitcher match-ups.  For example, in a head-to-head match-up 
between All-Star pitcher Roger Clemens and All-Star hitter Barry Bonds, the projected 
batting average for the 2004 season would be the following: 
 
=  _______      _(BatAvg*PitAvg)/(LgAvg)_________________ 
(BatAvg*PitAvg)/(LgAvg) + ((1-BatAvg)*(1-PitAvg))/(1-LgAvg)) 
 
=  __________(.362*.208)/(.272)__________ 
(.362*.208)/(.272) +((.638)*(.792))/(.728)) 
 
= .285 projected batting average.   
 
Similarly, if we remove the strong Barry Bonds and insert the weaker Adam 
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Dunn, the projected batting average would fall to .257 
 
3.1 Application of Levitt’s Theory 
The equation introduced by Levitt, by way of Bill James, produces a useful and 
effective tool to predict future batting averages of head-to-head matchups.  The question 
becomes:  Can one extrapolate the frequency of singles, doubles, triples, etc. from a 
unitary statistic such as a batting average?   
To initially compare trends in performance versus batting average, I used Batter 
Versus Pitcher Match-ups (Bill James, 1994) to collect data on 194 batters and 635,921 
at-bats prior to the 1995 season.  I grouped players by batting average, and calculated 
their associated ratios of single, doubles, triples, homeruns, strikeouts, non-strikeout outs, 
walks and hit batsmen.  The purpose of this analysis was meant to assess initial high-level 
trends in the data. 
 
Table 3.1a: Trends, By Average 
Range No. S/H D/H T/H HR/H K/Out Non-K/Out BB/AB HBP/AB
.330-.340 1 74.3% 19.8% 2.1% 3.8% 11.5% 88.5% 15.9% 0.32% 
.320-.330 1 60.8% 20.7% 1.2% 17.3% 24.2% 75.8% 22.2% 0.53% 
.310-.320 1 71.9% 17.2% 2.7% 8.2% 19.4% 80.6% 5.8% 0.73% 
.300-.310 7 67.8% 19.6% 2.8% 9.7% 14.2% 85.8% 10.0% 0.53% 
.290-.300 12 73.0% 16.8% 3.0% 7.2% 16.4% 83.6% 11.8% 0.66% 
.280-.290 25 70.2% 17.0% 3.2% 9.6% 18.3% 81.7% 9.9% 0.56% 
.270-.280 20 68.7% 18.3% 2.4% 10.6% 20.5% 79.5% 9.8% 0.52% 
.260-.270 40 69.8% 17.8% 2.4% 10.0% 21.0% 79.0% 9.2% 0.71% 
.250-.260 42 68.9% 17.7% 3.0% 10.4% 23.3% 76.7% 8.7% 0.71% 
.240-.250 29 68.2% 17.5% 2.8% 11.5% 25.5% 74.5% 9.6% 0.65% 
.230-.240 9 70.9% 18.2% 1.6% 9.4% 24.0% 76.0% 9.0% 0.91% 
.220-.230 5 65.6% 17.5% 2.1% 14.9% 30.3% 69.7% 10.4% 0.96% 
.210-.220 2 57.9% 19.0% 0.6% 22.5% 39.1% 60.9% 13.5% 1.04% 




Given the low number of batters with averages greater than .300 and lower than 
.230, these 'outside' ranges were eliminated since their small sample size might distort 
true relationships.   
 
Table 3.1b: Condensed Trends, By Average 
Range No. S/H D/H T/H HR/H K/Out Non-K/Out BB/AB HBP/AB
.290-.300 12 73.0% 16.8% 3.0% 7.2% 16.4% 83.6% 11.8% 0.66% 
.280-.290 25 70.2% 17.0% 3.2% 9.6% 18.3% 81.7% 9.9% 0.56% 
.270-.280 20 68.7% 18.3% 2.4% 10.6% 20.5% 79.5% 9.8% 0.52% 
.260-.270 40 69.8% 17.8% 2.4% 10.0% 21.0% 79.0% 9.2% 0.71% 
.250-.260 42 68.9% 17.7% 3.0% 10.4% 23.3% 76.7% 8.7% 0.71% 
.240-.250 29 68.2% 17.5% 2.8% 11.5% 25.5% 74.5% 9.6% 0.65% 
 194 69.2% 17.7% 2.7% 10.4% 21.8% 78.2% 9.7% 0.67% 
 
 The condensed chart seems to indicate a positive relationship between batting 
average and singles/hit, non-strikeout outs/out, and walks/at-bat while indicating a 
negative relationship with doubles/hit, home runs/hit, strikeouts/out and hit batsmen/at-
bat.  Interesting the one category that does not show a positive or negative relationship is 
triples/hit.  However, this category shows a curvilinear relationship, with peaks at the 
extreme. 
In order to take the analysis from high-level trends to a more detailed driven 
analysis, I more closely scrutinized each of the above eight variables and divided them 
into three major headings: hits (containing singles, doubles, triples and homeruns), outs 




3.1.1 Section I – Outs 
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A batter can be retired in one of two ways: by a strikeout or by a hit-out.  The 
following subsection is devoted to analyzing the relationship between the two options and 
determining whether one can predict their future likelihood based on historical statistics. 
Using Batter Versus Pitcher Match-Ups (1994) as a source for data, I compiled 
the historical statistics from 194 batters and 14 pitchers, each within the American 
League.  The data set includes the same 635,921 at bats used above as well as 118,785 
batters faced (754,706 total at-bats).  The data set includes only hitter-versus-pitcher 
relationships that contain greater than 20 at-bats.  Using this dataset, I analyzed the 
strikeout-per-out (k/out) ratio. 
 
A regression analysis was conducted using the head-to-head k/out ratio as the 
dependent variable and the historical ratios of both the pitchers and hitters as the 
independent ratios.  As the input data is in the form of percentages, the typical method of 
ordinary leased squared does not apply.  Therefore, negative binomial regression was 
used to rid the data of its sigmoid-shaped curve.  I performed this alteration by altering 




When originally conducted with all 1,146 runs, the R-Squared was approximately 
20%.  However, in a secondary test, runs that contained extreme values were removed, 
leaving an R-Squared of 48%.  Extreme values were represented by data sets where both 
the career percentage of the batter and the career percentage of the pitcher varied from 
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the head-to-head percentage by greater than 10%.  This discrepancy was interpreted to 
mean that the head-to-head percentage was inconsistent and not representative of the true 
relationship.  Using this new data, containing 505 total runs, the output looked as follows:  
 
Table 3.1.1a: Regression Results, K/Out 








Pitcher’s K/Out 0.6489009 0.057797 11.22723 0 
Batter’s K/Out 0.5357182 0.033805 15.84722 0 
Constant 0.1906349 0.07794 2.4459 0.007 
  R-Squared   0.484 
  R-Squared (adjusted)  0.482 
  F-Stat   237.135 
 
Therefore the equation to calculate the head-to-head Strikeout/Out ratio can be 
represented as follows: 
 
Head to Head K/O = 0.1906349+ P-K/O*(0.6489009) + B-K/O*(0.5357182) 
 
**Note that K/O is the ratio of strikeouts per out, P-K/O is the pitcher’s historical K/O 
ratio and B-K/O is the batter’s historical K/O ratio. 
 
The simulation model employs this equation to determine the relative ratio of 
strikeouts versus outs.  However, please note that each of the three percentages must be 
converted (and reconverted) to take into account the transformation to the negative 
binomial regression form.  This information can also be used to determine the percentage 
of non-K outs.  As Levitt’s theory determines the total percentage of outs, and the above 
regression analysis determines the percentage of K/out, the remainder would fall in to the 
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non-K category.  
 
3.1.2 Section II – Hits 
This section determines a reasonable approach for estimating the percentage of 
hits that will be singles, doubles, triples or homeruns. Each of these constitutes a variable. 
 
3.1.2.1 Homeruns per Hit 
 
Similar to previous sections, data was regressed, removing all extreme and 
abnormal data points2.  The final data set included 556 runs.  The negative binomial 
regression data looks as follows: 
 
Table 3.1.2.1a: Regression Results, HR/H 








Pitcher’s HR/H 5.478921 1.441312 8.981361 0 
Batter’s HR/H 1.9979163 0.130760 15.27923 0 
Constant 12.944944 0.617769 8.868912 0 
  R-Squared   0.4004 
  R-Squared (adjusted)  0.4026 
  F-Stat   187.351 
 
Given the above data, the equation to determine the future head-to-head HR/H 
ratio is as follows: 
 
HR/H = 12.944944 + (B- HR/H)*1.9979163 + (P- HR/H)*5.4789421 
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3.1.2.2 Ratio of Singles, Doubles and Triples per Hit 
This section created a little more difficulty than that of homeruns.  When negative 
binomial regression analysis was run, the total variances explained by the regression were 
4.8% and 5.8% respectively for doubles and triples.  These numbers were far too small to 
create useful simulation data.  I was able to overcome this on the basis of my experience 
with baseball and my knowledge of professional players: there are certain types of hitters 
who are more inclined to hit doubles and triples. Especially in respect to triples, speedy 
base-runners are far more likely to hit triples than slower, more powerful, batters.  
Furthermore, data trends show that the ability to hit safely for triples is not significantly 
effected by the particular pitcher.  Therefore it was deemed reasonable to use historical 
triples/hit ratios for given batters.  This could be logically extended to include doubles, as 
again, speedy batters are more inclined to hit them, and the data indicates that this doesn’t 
vary greatly depending on the pitcher.  Given that it was is possible to determine the total 
number of hits, percentage of homeruns, percentage of doubles and percentage of triples, 
I obtained the category of singles by subtration.  (singles = hits – home runs – doubles - 
triples) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Representing all data sets where both the batter’s historical HR/H ratio and the pitcher’s 
historical HR/H ratio varied from the head-to-head ratio by greater than 10%. 
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3.1.3 Section III - Other 
 
3.1.3.1 Walks per At-Bat 
Similar to the above regression data that I ran on the strikeout/out ratio and the 
homerun/hit ratio, I collected and regressed data with respect to the number of walks a 
player will receive in the course of their total number of at-bats.  (Total at-bats include 
hits and outs).  Again, I eliminated extreme and abnormal data, leaving 940 total runs3.  
Given this analysis, the output looked as follows: 
 
Table 3.1.3.1a: Regression Results, BB/AB 








Pitcher’s BB/AB 2.2616779 0.281364 8.03825 0 
Batter’s BB/AB 2.2539445 0.172654 13.0546 0 
Constant 7.2333445 0.765607 9.44785 0 
  R-Squared   0.201 
  R-Squared (adjusted)  0.200 
  F-Stat   118.540 
 
Therefore, the equation to properly determine the number of walks a player will generate 
per at-bat is equal to: 
 
BB/AB = 7.2333445 + (P-BB/AB)*2.2616779 + (B-BB/AB)*2.2539455 
 
3.1.3.2 Hit-By-Pitcher per At-Bat 
Similar to the situation with doubles and triples, regression with respect to hit 
batsmen rendered statistically insignificant results.  However, I feel that it is reasonable 
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to assume that the HBP/AB ratio will closely mirror that of the individual pitcher as the 
pitcher is primarily in control of the location of the pitch.  
 
3.1.4 Example 
To clearly illustrate the use of the above data analysis and the creation of the 
normative percentages, the following example show a match-up between Barry Bonds, a 
batter on the San Francisco Giants, and Roger Clemens, a pitcher on the Houston Astros.  
All data used is from the 2004 season.  The initial step was to determine, using Levine’s 
theory, the projected battering average in a head-to-head match-up.  Using the 
pitcher/batter matchup equation introduced in Section 3.0, the projected average between 
Barry Bonds (.362 average) and Roger Clemens (.208 average against) is .285.   
 
Table 3.1.4a: Summary, Projected Averages 
Category Name Average 
Batter Bonds, Barry       0.362  
Pitcher Clemens, Roger       0.208  
League MLB       0.272  
Projected Average         0.285  
 
This number means that of every 100 at-bats between Barry Bonds and Roger 
Clemens, Barry Bonds will garner approximately 29 hits and 71 outs.  Using the 
regression equations for HR/H, BB/AB and K/out, as well as historical information for 
HBP, doubles and triples, the following totals and percentages can be calculated. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Representing all data sets where both the batter’s historical BB/AB ratio and the 
pitcher’s historical BB/AB ratio varied from the head-to-head ratio by greater than 10%. 
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Table 3.1.4b: Summary, Projected Probabilities 
 S D T HR K Non-K BB HBP 
Totals 14 6 1 8 19 53 49 - 





I employed a simulation tool to predict the aggregate outcome of all relationship 
that would occur during the remainder of that inning.  The purpose of this simulation was 
to measure its strategic effect by predicting the expected future runs in a scenario in 
which an IBB was imparted, and the expected future runs in a scenario in which an IBB 
was not imparted.  
The simulation tool itself was created in Microsoft Excel and takes advantage of 
numerous lookup tables and random number generation as it predicts future behaviour 
based on historical statistics.  Using the Boston Red Sox as an example, a final scenario 
window would look as follows: 
 
Table 4.0a: Simulation 
Lineup 
B/G 
Scenario Outcome End Scenario Outs 
Runs 
Scored 
Johnny Damon      
Orlando Cabrera      
Manny Ramirez      
David Ortiz      
Kevin Millar      
Bill Mueller      
Dave Roberts      
Doug Mientkiewicz      
Pokey Reese      
Total      
 
In the above table, Lineup represents the hitters in the Boston Red Sox lineup that 
are due up during the inning under investigation.  The model allows for as many as 9 
hitters as less than 0.1% of all innings last beyond 9 at-bats. 
B/G Scenario represents the game scenario, as of the first pitch of the at-bat.  As 
there are 24 potential combinations of scenarios as determined by the number of base 
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runners and outs, there are 24 scenarios that could occur prior to an at-bat.  Each of the 24 
possible scenarios was given a number from 1 to 24. The details of all 24 scenarios can 
be seen in the Appendix A binary chart, where one represents ‘Yes’ and zero represents 
‘No’.   
The column titled Outcome represents the calculated outcome of a head-to-head 
at-bat between the given pitcher and the given batter based on historical data fed through 
a pre-specified regression program.  That outcome is based on a random seed, which in 
turn is based on possible events and the likelihood of those events. 
End Scenario represents the scenario that is a result of the initial scenario and the 
outcome of the present at-bat.  Similar to the B/G scenario, the end scenario is allotted a 
number between 1 and 24.   
The column labeled Outs represents the number of outs in the inning at the end of 
the at-bat, based on the relationship between the initial scenario and the end scenario.  
The final column, labeled Runs, describes the number of runners who crossed 
home plate due the outcome of that lone at-bat. The value of the runs generated is based 
on the initial scenario and the at-bat’s outcome.  
The subsequent section will discuss the individual columns as well as the 
mathematics and modeling techniques behind them. 
 
4.1 Calculating Outcome 
The column in Table A entitled Outcome represents the key output to the 
relationship between the pitcher and primary batter.  This relationship is expressed as a 
mathematical relationship between historical statistics, and is presented in the form of 
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probable percentages that each of the eight possible scenarios will occur (single, double, 
triple, homerun, strikeout, walk, out, hit by pitch).  Given these probabilities, a randomly 
generated number, in combination with the weights of these percentages, will give the 
calculated result.  
 
4.1.1 Step 1: Outcome Probabilities 
In the example of an at-bat between a Boston Red Sox hitter and New York 
Yankee pitcher Mike Mussina, I determined the following probabilities based on 
historical statistics calculated by the methods described in the previous section: 
 
Table 4.1.1a: Hitter Specific Probabilities 
  Probability 
Hitter Single Double Triple Homerun Walk Non-K Strikeout HBP 
Johnny Damon 18.2% 5% 0.9% 3.5% 7.3% 51.3% 13.9% 0% 
Orlando Cabrera 16.5% 5.6% 0.4% 2.3% 3.2% 58.4% 13.5% 0% 
Manny Ramirez 14% 7% 0% 6.5% 8.7% 44.9% 18.9% 0% 
David Ortiz 13.1% 7.3% 0.5% 6.2% 7.7% 45.5% 19.7% 0% 
Kevin Millar 17% 6.3% 0% 3.8% 6.6% 48.9% 17.4% 0% 
Bill Mueller 16.1% 6% 0.2% 3.3% 7.6% 51.5% 15.4% 0% 
Dave Roberts 15.3% 3.8% 1.9% 1.9% 7.1% 53.6% 16.3% 0% 
Doug Mientkiewicz 13.9% 5.4% 0.2% 2% 7.3% 55.1% 16.1% 0% 
Pokey Reese 15.6% 2.6% 0.7% 1.8% 3.7% 53.2% 22.4% 0% 
 
4.1.2 Step 2: Random Number Generation 
As a means of simulating an actual at-bat, a random number is uniformly 
generated between 0 and 1, using the function =RAND() in Microsoft Excel, which will 
determine the outcome of the at-bat, given the above probabilities.  For each batter a 




Table 4.1.2a: Random Numbers 
Hitter Random No. 
Johnny Damon 0.47 
Orlando Cabrera 0.93 
Manny Ramirez 0.89 
David Ortiz 0.91 
Kevin Millar 0.95 
Bill Mueller 0.76 
Dave Roberts 0.22 
Doug Mientkiewicz 0.0 
Pokey Reese 0.72 
 
 
4.1.3 Step 3: Reported Outcome 
The final step is to use the randomly generated number as a tool to help simulate 
the outcome of an at-bat.  Based on the random number, using the Boston Red Sox’s 
Johnny Damon as an example, the outcome will look as follows: 
 
Table 4.1.3a:  Outcome Possibilities 
Range Outcome 
0 – 0.18 Single 
0.18 – 0.23 Double 
0.23 – 0.24 Triple 
0.24 – 0.27 Homerun 
0.27 – 0.38 Walk 
0.38 – 0.90 Out (non-strikeout) 
0.90 – 1.0 Strikeout 
 
Therefore, in the given scenario, where the randomly generated number is 0.47, 
the outcome will be an Out as shown in Table 4.1.3a.  This method is repeated for every 




4.2 End Scenario 
The end scenario represents the scenario that occurs at the end of the at-bat, or at 
the beginning of the subsequent at-bat.  Based on simplistic analysis of running speed, 
and taking into account only the final destination of the batter, the end scenario could be 
generated through the table found in Appendix B. 
Intuitive reasoning and experience with baseball suggests that not all hits lead to 
the same outcome, nor to the same base destination for the lead runner.  For example, 
where a single is hit with a runner on first base, the lead runner won’t necessarily remain 
at second base and may make their way to third.  Similarly, a runner may be able to 
advance an additional base given that a single was hit to right field as opposed to left 
field. 
This idea was emphasized in an article written by Dan Levitt entitled Hitters and 
Baserunner Advancement (1999).  Levitt discusses the aggregate analysis of historical 
statistics between the years 1980 and 1983 and shows that there is in fact a statistical 
difference given the placement of a batter’s hit, but that it varies depending on the 
situation. 
 
Table 4.2a: Single with Runner on First 
  Runner Destination – Percent  
Fielder # of hits Out Second Third Home Bases/hit 
N/A 1,727 1.5% 69.3% 28.5% 0.8% 1.3 
LF 8,952 2.1% 77.8% 19.1% 1.0% 1.21 
CF 8,465 2.2% 61.5% 34.6% 1.8% 1.38 
RF 8,757 2.2% 46.9% 49.4% 1.6% 1.52 
INF 3,231 1.9% 87.4% 9.2% 1.5% 1.12 




As shown in the above table, analyzing the 31,132 singles that occurred with a 
runner on first, on average 65.2% of the lead runners ended up on second, 31.3% on 
third, 1.4% at home and 2.1% of the lead runners were out.   
By segmenting those hits between left field (LF), center field (CF), right field 
(RF) and infield (INF), it is possible to see variations with respect to those destination 
percentages.  With most of the variance occurring between second base and third base, 
one can see that, based on historical statistics, runners are more likely to advance to third 
when the single was hit to RF (49.4%) than if the ball was hit to CF (34.6%) or LF 
(19.1%).  These statistics seem reasonable as the throw from RF to third base is the 
longest, while the throw from LF is the shortest. 
Similar analysis was conducted using a single with a runner on second, a single 
with a runner on third, a double with a runner on first, and a double with a runner on 
second.  Their respective tables and probabilities can be found in Appendices C through 
F. 
With respect to the simulation created for the purpose of this project, I decided 
not to model the destination of the hit, but rather the overall statistics that describe the 
advancement of the runner. 
Based on the information gathered by Levitt, I deduced the probability of a runner 
advancing to a particular base, given the type of hit.  For example, given a single where a 
runner is on first, the lead runner will end up out 2.1% of the time, end up at second base 
65.2% of the time, end up at third base 31.3% of the time and will end up at home 1.4% 
of the time.  It is these probabilities that were inserted into the simulation model to more 
realistically simulate actual events.   
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Table 4.2b: Aggregate Information to be used in Simulation Tool 
 Lead Runner Destination - Percent 
Scenario Out Second Third Home 
Single w/ Runner on 1st 2.1% 65.2% 31.3% 1.4% 
Single w/ Runner on 2nd 3.6% 1.2% 29.9% 65.3% 
Double w/ Runner on 1st 3.1%  53.6% 43.3% 
Double w/ Runner on 2nd 0.1%  1.4% 98.4% 
Single w/ Runner on 3rd 0.1%  0.9% 99.0% 
Total 0.1%  1.4% 98.4% 
 
This information was inserted into the simulation through the use of look-up 
tables and simple spreadsheet calculations.  By way of illustration, the remainder of this 
section will discuss possible outcomes of scenario 4: a runner on first with zero out. 
As described in Table 1, given a single, there are four possible outcomes, each 
representing a different destination for the lead runner: 
 
Scenario 1 – Outcome includes runners on first, runner on second (65.2% probability) 
Scenario 2 – Outcome includes runner on first, runner on third (31.3% probability) 
Scenario 3 – Outcome includes runner on first, runner out (2.1% probability) 
Scenario 4 – Outcome includes runner on first, runner at home (1.4% probability) 
 
Similarly, given a double, there are three possible outcomes: 
 
Scenario 1 – Outcome includes runner on second, runner on third (53.6% probability) 
Scenario 2 – Outcome includes runner on second, runner at home (43.3% probability) 
Scenario 3 – Outcome includes runner on second, runner out (3.1% probability) 
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Given the above scenarios, I used a randomly generated number in conjunction 
with a selection process — similar to that utilized in the Outcome section of the model — 
to select a fair representation of the simulation process. 
The overall table, which represents all available options with respect to lead 
runner destinations, can be found in Appendix G. 
 
4.3 Out 
The column entitled Outs represents the number of outs in the inning at the end of 
the at-bat.  This number is generated using a look-up table based on the beginning 




The final column, entitled Runs, describes the number of runners that crossed 
home plate due to the outcome of that lone at-bat.  The value of the runs generated, based 
on the initial scenario and the at-bat’s outcome, is represented by a look-up table that can 
be found in Appendix I. 
 
4.5 Aggregate Tool 
Therefore, based on the look-up tables, and information generated from both 
internal and third-party analysis, the final simulation table depicts the most probable run 
production for the remainder of any given inning.  The following situation takes into 
account not only the starting lineup of the Boston Red Sox and the starting pitcher of the 
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New York Yankees, but also the in-game scenario. Based on this information, the table 
predicts a quick two-batter inning and no runs scored. 
 
Table 4.5a – Simulation 
Lineup 
B/G 
Scenario Outcome End Scenario Outs 
Runs 
Scored 
Johnny Damon 8 Out 9 2 0 
Orlando Cabrera 9 Strikeout End 3 0 
Manny Ramirez End Strikeout End End End 
David Ortiz End Strikeout End End End 
Kevin Millar End Strikeout End End End 
Bill Mueller End Out End End End 
Dave Roberts End Homerun End End End 
Doug Mientkiewicz End Single End End End 
Pokey Reese End Out End End End 
Total     0 
 
I must stress that the above example is only one of numerous possible outcomes 
that are highly dependent on the random number generated for each player.  To give a 
more accurate prediction, I simulated the total inning a number of times and averaged and 
analyzed the final run tally.  As can be seen in Table 4.5b below, the average runs scored 
in this situation would be 0.6.   
The question then becomes, what would the outcome of the scenario be if Johnny 
Damon were given an Intentional Base-on-Balls?  This can be easily computed by 
substituting the word ‘walk’ in the Outcome column.  Simulating the scenario 20 times 
gives the following results: 
 36
 
Table 4.5b: 20 Scenario Result 
Scenario No. No IBB Yes IBB 
1 1 0 
2 1 1 
3 0 4 
4 0 3 
5 1 0 
6 0 3 
7 0 0 
8 0 0 
9 0 2 
10 2 1 
11 1 2 
12 0 2 
13 1 0 
14 0 0 
15 3 0 
16 1 3 
17 0 1 
18 0 0 
19 0 4 
20 1 0 
Average Runs 0.6 1.3 
 
Based on 20 scenarios, and based on the validity of the imported data, it seems 
apparent that in the situation where Johnny Damon is up against Mike Mussina with a 
runner on second and one out, the best strategy would be to pitch to him.  Not only are 
the average runs dramatically higher with an IBB, but the variance also poses a heavy 
risk since, in 8/20 scenarios, more than one run would be scored.  This type of simulation 
and analysis can be used for any combination of hitters and batters and applied to any in-
game scenario.
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5.0 Disparity between Normative Model and Visible Action 
With the normative model, we can analyze the historic use of the IBB and verify 
the success of those decisions.   
 
5.1 Aggregate Analysis of the Intentional Base-on-Balls 
While it is easy to criticize a manager’s decision based on a single situation, the 
more accurate method would be to analyze the aggregate results of many decisions.  It is 
for this reason that I analyzed all 47 IBBs issued during the major-league week of June 1, 
2004.  This selection represents a typical week, covers the spectrum of intentional base-
on-ball usage, and represents the range of major league managers’ decision-making 
abilities and strategies.  It does not restrict my analysis to any one of the three major IBB 
usage techniques, but tests all three.  The 47 situations were run through the simulation 
model to verify the effectiveness of the decision.  My model indicated that in 22 of the 47 
situations an IBBS was the correct decision, in 25 of them, the manager would have been 




 Pitch Walk 




Walk 25 23 
 
A failure rate greater than 50% is poor by any business or sport standard.  
Managers can ill-afford to make 25 strategic errors per week on a minor decision like the 
IBB.  Furthermore, in 12 of the 47 examples, independent of the strategy used, the 
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offensive team was able to score at least one run.  In these examples, the average runs 
scored per inning were slightly higher for the situations in which the normative model 
suggested a pitch as opposed to the situations where it suggested an IBB.  
In a sport wrought with statistics and variables, managers must learn to utilize the 
objective tools available to them to minimize errors, and minimize the future runs their 
errors would create.  As managers are not typically statisticians or mathematicians, the 
usefulness of these tools may not be apparent.  It is for this reason that I believe that the 




Date: April 14, 2004 
Game: San Francisco Giants against the Milwaukee Brewers 
Situation: 3-0 Milwaukee in the seventh inning 
• Two out with runners on first and second base 
• Milwaukee’s Jason Bennett is pitching to Barry Bonds 
 
In the above example, the manager of the Milwaukee Brewers seems to make a 
cardinal mistake walking Barry Bonds to load the bases when his team is leading by three 
runs late in the game.  By walking Barry Bonds, the manager is bringing the winning run 
to the plate, meaning that a homerun by Edgardo Alfonzo would propel the San Francisco 
Giants into the lead.  In this instance, logic might suggest that the manager used the IBB 
when it was unnecessary. 
Upon running the simulation in turns out that the manager’s decision was, in fact, 
correct in that the projected future runs given an IBB is 0.65 and the projected future runs 
without an IBB is 0.9.  Furthermore, not only did San Francisco score in more simulated 
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situations with the IBB, the average number of runs scored per instance was higher as 
well.  This matches with the actual occurrence of a fly-out by the subsequent batter 
Edgardo Alfonzo. 
So in this situation the suggestion of the normative model reflects the decision of 
the manager, where traditional baseball thinkers might have acted otherwise.   
 
Example 2 
Date: April 11, 2004 
Game: San Francisco Giants against the San Diego Padres 
Situation: 3-0 San Diego in the eighth inning 
• One out and runners on second and third base 
• San Diego’s Jay Witasick is pitching to Barry Bonds  
 
In the above situation Barry Bonds was intentionally walked to load the bases 
with only one out with the San Diego Padres leading 3-0 in the eighth inning.  What 
actually occurred was a 5-run outburst propelling the Giants to a 5-3 lead at the end of the 
inning.  Simulating the situation in my model, the results suggest that no IBB should have 
been issued.  While the projected future runs with an IBB are 1.9, they are only 1.5 
without an IBB. 
 
Example 3 
Date: April 20, 2004 
Game: Toronto Blue Jays against the Boston Red Sox 
Situation (Part A): 3-0 Boston in the seventh inning 
• One out with a runner on second base 
• Toronto’s Acquilino Lopez is pitching to Manny Ramirez 
Situation (Part B):  4-0 Boston in the seventh inning 
• Two out with runners on second and third base 
• Toronto’s Valerio De Los Santo is pitching to Mark Bellhorn 
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The above situation contains two separate IBBs, each of which can be analyzed 
for their strategic accuracy.  Simulating the first IBB indicates that it would have been 
better to pitch to the batter, in that the projected runs is 0.85 with an IBB, and 0.35 
without.  This is further reinforced in that the manager of the Toronto Blue Jays chose to 
walk Manny Ramirez and the pitcher subsequently let up a run-scoring double.  
Simulating the second IBB also indicates a mistake, with the projected runs being 0.45 
for an IBB and 0.25 for not issuing an IBB.   
 
5.3 Aggregate Analysis of a Non-Intentional Base-on-Balls 
Similar to Section 5.1, the normative model was used to analyze 50 random 
decisions that did not result in an IBB.  The purpose of this analysis is to measure the 
degree of Type II errors.  Using 50 randomly selected at-bats during the same week 
beginning June 1, 2004, in only three cases did the model call for walking the batter when 
the manager decided to pitch to them.  This suggests that managers rarely make the 




 Pitch Walk 




Walk C D 
 
The three scenarios in which the model suggested an IBB were extremely similar 
in that they involved the batter directly preceding a poor-hitting pitcher in the National 
League.  In these scenarios, the pitcher had a batting average below .200 with less than 1 
homerun per hitter.  However, it may be argued that the manager did not impart an IBB, 
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in fear of a pinch-hitter with stronger statistics.  Aggregating the tables in section 5.1 and 
5.3 shows the following results: 
 
Suggestion 
 Pitch Walk 




Walk 25 22 
 
This analysis suggests that the original hypothesis — that Type II errors will 
occur more prevalently than Type I errors — was correct by a factor of 8.   
 
25*Cost(Type II Error) > 3*Cost(Type I Error), or 
 
25 > Cost (Type I Error) 
3      Cost (Type II Error) 
 
Although it is difficult to determine the cost of each error, it is reasonable to 
assume that the cost of a Type I error is not eight times that of a Type II error, leaving 
room for necessary qualitative interpretations of the variance. 
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6.0 The Inherent Biases in the Decision 
In the sport of baseball, the game-to-game play calling is managed by an 
imperfect set of metrics and forecasted situations.  Presently, no manager possesses a tool 
that objectively analyzes the information at hand and computes most-likely outcomes of 
given strategic decisions.  Instead, the sport is governed by ‘experience’, ‘tradition’, and 
the fear of scrutiny by the media and upper management.  The simulation model 
proposed in this paper is meant to provide the objective tool presently unavailable. 
Due to the current regime of subjectivity, there is no governing formula with 
respect to the IBB.  As can be seen in the following chart, there is a large discrepancy 
with respect to the number of IBBs ordered by each team’s manager per 100 innings 
pitched.   
 
Table 6.0a: 2004 Intentional Base-on-Balls, By Team 
Team IBB/100 IP Team IBB/100 IP Team IBB/100 IP 
Colorado 7.5 Cincinnati 4.0 Los Angeles 2.5 
Arizona 7.2 Oakland 3.9 Minnesota 2.3 
Pittsburgh 5.8 Chicago (N) 3.4 Milwaukee 2.2 
Philadelphia 5.1 Baltimore 3.2 Anaheim 2.2 
Montreal 5.0 Detroit 3.0 Boston 2.2 
Atlanta 4.4 Tampa Bay 3.0 Seattle 2.0 
Florida 4.3 New York (A) 2.9 Chicago (A) 1.6 
Cleveland 4.3 Kansas City 2.8 Texas 0.6 
Houston 4.2 San Diego 2.6 Total 3.5 
Toronto 4.2 St. Louis 2.5   
New York (N) 4.0 San Francisco 2.5   
 
I hypothesize that, in the case of IBB decisions, there are a number of biases, as 
well as psychological and sociological phenomena that will shift the basis for a 
manager’s decision from the objective and rational towards the subjective and utility-
maximizing.  In this section, I suggest why disparity might exist between the normative 
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model and the reported actions.   
It is hypothesized that six psychological phenomena may play a role in the 
overuse of the IBB: loss aversion/risk aversion, representativeness bias, confirmation 
bias/availability bias, regret theory/omission-commission, path dependence, and an 
agency problem. 
Furthermore, it may be argued that even if management possessed an objective, 
forecasting tool such as the normative model presented in this paper, management would 
still be influenced by the following subjective biases and phenomena.  
 
6.1 Loss Aversion/Risk Aversion 
In the realm of business, relationships or sport, winning is always preferred to 
losing.  Winning provides self-confidence, enhances a participant’s self-image and 
improves social status while losing incurs the opposite.  All decisions entail the element 
of win-versus-lose element and the element of risk, that is, the possibility that the decider 
will make the choice that leads to the ‘loss’ as opposed to the ‘win’. 
Kahneman et al (1991) discuss the element of risk and state that individuals 
dislike losing so much that they will overcompensate towards a risk-averse position.  
Studies show that an individual faced with two scenarios, the first being an 85% chance 
of winning $1,000 and a 15% of winning nothing and the second being a 100% chance of 
winning $800 will almost always select the second alternative even though the present 
value of the first alternative is much greater.  This example represents the element of loss 
aversion/risk aversion.  Even in the case of equal expected values, individuals tend to 
lean towards the option with less variance in the outcomes.  Bernoulli (1954) suggests 
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that "people do not evaluate prospects by the expectation of their monetary outcome, but 
rather by the expectation of the subjective value of these outcomes." 
It is my hypothesis that a manager, facing a situation that might merit an IBB, 
may overcompensate (Type II error: call for an IBB when it might not be appropriate) to 
avoid a heavier loss associated with a homerun or extra-base hit.  This overcompensation 
would not be based on a fear of the batter, but rather a fear of allowing additional bases 
(or runs) that could have been avoided if an IBB had been initially bestowed.  Based on 
historic patterns, a batter is more likely to garner an IBB if he has a history of high 
homerun totals which are correlated with high strikeout totals.  Therefore, a manager will 
choose to walk a riskier batter for a batter with less extreme statistics. This notion goes 
against traditional expected utility theory that focuses on objective utility based on 
statistical analysis, and is more in line with prospect theory, suggested by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), which emphasizes the value function.   
One major portion of prospect theory is loss aversion.  Loss aversion refers to the 
tendency for people to strongly prefer avoiding losses to making gains.  In the course of 
studying monetary risk, Kahneman and Tversky’s developed prospect theory (1979), 
which holds that, while individuals were risk averse in a positive domain, they were risk 
seekers in a negative domain — a relationship that Kahenman and Tversky illustrated in 






Figure 6.1a: Kahneman and Tversky's Value Function 
 
 
It is further interesting to note that the scorekeeping practice of professional 
baseball also works against the manager, since the game focuses on the scoring of runs 
and the advancement of runners as opposed to the defensive aspects of that same play, 
which is in line with with Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) statement that “losses loom 
larger than gains". This implies that managers may be more risk averse than necessary. 
They fear the negative repercussions of their actions, whereas, if they focused on the 
positive/defensive outcomes of their decisions, they would be less risk-averse. 
 
6.2 Representativeness Bias 
Ideally, one should assess probability based on exact historical information.  In 
the case of professional baseball, if a manager is interested in understanding the ability of 
a given batter, the manager must ensure that he is taking all variables into account that 
will affect the on-field outcome.  This type of analysis must include not only an analysis 
of the batter’s ability versus that of the given pitcher but also the exact scenario, where 
the scenario includes runner, outs, and secondary information such as inning, stadium, 
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fatigue and an athlete’s career curve as a representation of skill level. 
However, it has been argued that the representative bias will dissuade managers 
from seeking exact information in exchange for representative information, that is,  
information that is representative of the present scenario, but is not necessarily similar.  
Just as important, the representative bias addresses scenarios where no exact historical 
situation can be found and related scenarios must be substituted. 
The notion of representativeness implies basing a judgment on facts and signs, 
similar to those in the present situation, that one compares in order to make an objective, 
as opposed to subjective, decision.  In order to forecast the outcome of alternatives, 
individuals often compare the situation at hand versus base case scenarios that are 
“representative” of the problem presently faced.   But the term “representative bias” 
refers to a distinction between what is representative and what is probable.  For example, 
J. Tenenbaum and T. Griffith state that ‘being divorced four times’ is more representative 
of a Hollywood actress than is ‘voting democratic,’ but in reality the former is certainly 
less likely.  The issue, then, is to determine what the base-case scenarios are, and which 
ones are most representative. 
With respect to baseball and the IBB phenomenon, managers will often compare 
the present situation to some historical scenario as a means of capturing the most likely 
outcome of each alternative.  The manager may use his own experience, the historical 
stats of the batter, the historical statistics of the pitcher, or any of a multitude of statistical 
compilations. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982b) state that people often evaluate the probability of 
an uncertain event or a sample ‘by the degree to which it is (i) similar in essential 
 47
properties to its parent population and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by 
which it is generated’. 
Using the first criterion – that of parent population – Tversky and Kahneman state 
that the situation at hand will be compared to similar historical situations.  However, as 
baseball is rich in statistics, it is difficult to know which statistics are the most important 
and relevant to the situation at hand.  Does one focus on the positive categories of hitters 
such as hits and homeruns, or does one focus on the positive categories of pitchers such 
as wins and strikeouts?  Does one focus on the negative categories of hitters such as 
strikeout and double-plays, or does one focus on the negative categories of pitchers such 
as hits allowed and walks.  With each individual statistic, there are a multitude of 
computations and permutations that create even more numerical data.  It is easy for 
managers to lose track of all this information. 
Similarly, a manager may inadvertently group his hitter in a larger category of 
hitters with similar historical statistics and base a decision on the abilities of the category 
given the same situation.  For example, a manager facing a situation that involves a 
young hitter who holds a high batting average may utilize historical information 
comparing the present hitter to a prototypical hitter with a high career batting average, 
someone such as Wade Boggs, Tony Gwynn and Paul Molitor.  
Tversky and Kahneman’s second criterion for determining the probability of an 
uncertain event – that of the “salient features of the process” –cannot be directly used to 
either support or weaken the given hypothesis. It entails an analysis of what items will 
initially jump into the cognitive awareness of the manager and which instances are easiest 
to recall.  Salience may play itself out as a recent situation where a manager chose to 
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impart a base-on-balls and its subsequent outcome.  This aspect of representativeness 
may have a cross-over effect with biases such as availability and confirmation bias, 
which I will discuss in subsequent sections. 
The overall concern with this bias is that managers, overcome with the pressure of 
the situation and the plethora of statistical data, may be blinded to the true base-case 
scenarios to which they should be comparing the situation at hand.  Kahnman and 
Tversky (1972), discuss the bias’ similarity to the gambler’s fallacy.  The fallacy suggests 
that a fair coin that has turned up HHH, is more likely to turn up T on its next flip than it 
is likely to turn up H.  Similarly, a batter who has recorded 5 successive hits is more 
likely to record an out during their next at-bat. 
The gambler’s fallacy differs from the hot-hand hypothesis put forward by 
Gilovich et al (1985), which states that a batter who has recorded 5 successive hits is 
more likely to record a hit during their next at-bat.  This hypothesis suggests that an 
individual’s skill, coupled with confidence, can lead them into a streak of either good or 
bad outcomes.  
A hypothetical example would be a batter with a lifetime batting average of .200, 
with 100 career at-bats, who had a .600 batting average against a pitcher in 5 career at-
bats.  The hot-hand hypothesis would suggest that the batter is likely to get a hit in his at-
bat against the pitcher, whereas an objective observer might suggest otherwise. 
I would suggest that these biases  — the gambler's fallacy and the hot hand 
syndrome — can co-exist in people's beliefs.  However, that individual will choose the 
bias that best suites his or her experience and personality.  A risk-taking baseball 
manager may select the gambler's fallacy because he is 'taking a chance' that something 
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different will occur in the next at-bat, while a risk-averse individual might look at trends 
and therefore choose to be influenced by the hot-hand syndrome. 
 
6.3 Confirmation Bias/Availability Bias 
When faced with a scenario that may or may not call for an IBB, the manager 
must use information available to him to make the ultimate decision.  In this situation, the 
manager must decide which information to use and how to interpret it.  These two 
questions can be answered by the “availability bias” and by the “confirmation bias”.  
These two biases presuppose that the manager already has a hypothesis as to which 
solution would be most effective in this situation.  This hypothesis is a byproduct of other 
biases and psychological/sociological phenomena. Risk aversion, path dependence, regret 
theory and representativeness typically contribute to the foundation for a hypothesis 
geared to the impartment of an IBB. 
The availability bias answers the first question: ‘What information does the 
manager chose from?’  More specifically, the availability bias states that one uses 
information that is readily available, and easier to recall, as a means of solving more 
complex problems.  For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1982a) use an example in 
which one may assess the divorce rate in a given community by recalling divorces among 
one’s acquaintances.  Similarly, a manager may allow information that is readily 
available to him to bias his decision-making process.  Given that Barry Bonds is 
constantly in the headlines for his offensive prowess and that managers may be 
constantly questioned as to how they will pitch to him, managers may be overly fearful of 
his ability and consequently adopt strategies that overcompensate.   
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Similarly, when facing a potential IBB situation, a manager may recall instances that 
have a more powerful recall effect and that therefore bias his decision-making.  For 
example, if Barry Bonds beat a manager last night with a homerun, the manager may be 
more willing to intentionally walk Bond in a similar situation, even though the 
probability of him hitting a homerun has not changed.  This is similar to the fallacy of 
misleading vividness, which suggests that vivid events tend to have more probability 
assigned to them than is really there. Whereas objective analysis would suggest an 
emphasis on statistical evidence, subjective analysis will be blurred by a particularly 
dramatic event 
The confirmation bias states that, when faced with a decision, an individual will 
seek out information that confirms their hypothesis and will not seek out information that 
refutes it (Klayman, 1995).  Therefore, when originally seeking information, which in the 
case of baseball is often in the form of historical statistics, the manager may only seek out 
that information that confirms his original hypothesis.   
An example might be head-to-head statistics between the hitter and the pitcher.  
Suppose that the overall, career-historical head-to-head statistics favour the pitcher and 
suppose that this season’s historical head-to-head statistics favour the batter.  Should his 
original inclination be to intentionally walk the batter, the manager may overweigh the 
significance of the latter piece of information and underweigh the significance of the 
former, independent of their relative likelihoods. 
The confirmation bias also answers the question: ‘How does he choose to 
interpret it?’ It deals with information that is ambiguous with respect to the hypothesis.  
The theory of confirmation bias states that, when faced with a decision, an individual will 
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interpret ambiguous information in favour of his hypothesis (Klayman, 1995).  In the 
above example of overall career head-to-head statistics, the manager will find a way to 
either (a) internalize the information in favor of the hypothesis, or (b) discredit the 
information.  One way would be to say that either the pitcher’s effectiveness has declined 
over his career, or the batter’s ability to read the pitcher has improved and therefore, only 
recent information should be taken into account. 
This issue is further complicated by the fact that the sport of baseball is permeated 
by statistics.  There are infinite ways of analyzing a particular situation and just as 
manner ways of distorting those numbers to fit one’s convenience.  When determining 
whether to intentionally walk a batter, a manager could focus on any number of statistics.  
Example might be the age of parties involved and their relative decline in production, 
weather conditions as they relate to player’s performance and momentum generated by 
one team during the game.  In addition there are a number of available statistics to 
consider in the course of making a decision:  Overall batting statistics, batting statistics 
when facing the same situation, overall pitcher’s statistics, pitcher’s statistics when facing 
the same situation, overall head-to-head statistics for the pitcher, head-to-head statistics 
for the pitcher when facing the same situation, etc.  Even when the decision regarding 
which statistics is made, the manager must also consider whether to use all-time statistics, 
season-to-date statistics, that week’s statistics or that day’s statistics.  Given the game’s 
obsession with statistics and the plethora of available comparisons, it is probable that one 





6.4 Regret Theory/Omission-Commission 
Life involves making decisions between available options.  Typically, an 
individual will weigh the options based on information available and, based on 
predetermined criteria, choose the option he or she hopes will maximize utility. In some 
cases, the path chosen turns out to be the optimal path, and in other cases, the chosen path 
is suboptimal.  Much research has shown that individuals, choosing the suboptimal path, 
will experience a negative emotion in response to their choice: regret (Zeelenberg).  The 
basis of regret is that the individual had the opportunity to choose a better alternative yet, 
for one of many reasons, did not and now find themselves in a worse position.  
Zeelenberg (1999) defines regret as a negative, cognitively-based emotion that we 
experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been better, 
had we decided differently.  Zeelenberg argues that the fear of anticipated regret will lead 
to risk-averse decision-making.  
A manager, facing a scenario that may merit an intentional base-on-ball would be 
forced to decide between two options, (a) to impart an intentional base-on-ball or (b) not 
to impart an intentional base-on-ball.  Should the outcome of the decision be poor, the 
manager may feel regret with respect to their decision.  Zeelenberg (1999) would argue 
that a manager, fearing the eventual backlash of regret, would be inclined to lean towards 
the risk-minimizing decision to impart an intentional base-on-ball, since this decision 




 In a second article Zeelenberg et al (2002) breaks regret into two separate 
categories.  The first category is commission (or hot regret) and the second category of 
omission (or wistful regret).  Hot regret is the direct emotional reaction to the outcome, 
while wistful regret is the less intense emotion associated with pleasantly sad fantasies of 
what might have been.  The paper argues that regret is more intense in the case of 
commission than in the case of omission.  In a related paper, Gilovich and Medvec 
(1995) reinforce Zeelenberg's argument by suggesting that that actions tend to generate 
more regret in the short term, but inactions tend to be more troubling in the long run. 
In similar fashion, a manager faces the potential of two suboptimal results when 
deciding upon an IBB.  If the manager chose to impart an IBB — an act of commission 
— and the outcome was negative, he might feel a negative sense of hot regret as his 
direct action led to a suboptimal result.  The manager might wonder whether his directive 
was the cause of the result.  However, if the manager chose not to impart an intentional 
base-on-ball and the outcome was negative — an act of omission — the manager might 
feel a negative sense of wistful regret, since his lack of action led to a suboptimal result.  
The manager would subsequently wonder whether the outcome would have differed had 
he imparted the IBB. 
Zeelenberg (2002) would argue that a manager would opt towards not imparting 
the IBB (omission), as the action would minimize the potential regret.  The author 
suggests that the regret associated with omission is less than the regret associated with 
commission as commission is a direct result of a conscious decision that can be directly 
associated to a single decision-maker. Gilovich and Medvec (1995) similarly argued that 
a manager would opt towards the omission option because it would minimize his regret in 
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the short term.  Omission minimizes regret in the short term as it takes the blame and 
responsibility out of the manager’s hand and puts its squarely on the ability of the 
players. 
While the above arguments seem to reflect the earlier hypothesis, it should be 
noted that an article by Ritov and Baron (1995) maintains that an individual will be 
biased towards commission in cases where the outcomes of the option not chosen will 
never be known.  As it is impossible to know the outcome of unselected alternatives in 
baseball, it can be argued that managers would be biased towards an IBB.  Therefore, 
walking the hitter when in doubt is the best alternative. 
  
6.5 Path Dependence 
Suppose you have ten dollars in your pocket. Would you feel any different if the 
money fell out of your pocket as opposed to your being robbed of it?  Path dependence 
says that the manner in which the action (losing the $10) occurs will have different 
effects on the individual and will result in different levels of happiness/sadness. I call this 
“path dependence.” 
In order to relate path dependence to baseball, consider the following scenario: It 
is a tie game in the bottom of the ninth inning.  There are two outs and a runner on 
second.  A team’s best hitter is up with the team’s worst hitter on deck.  What do you do? 
Logic would argue that you walk the present batter and pitch to the team’s worst hitter.  
Now imagine two scenarios.  In the first scenario the manager walks the initial, better 
batter, but the second batter (the worst hitter) hits a game-winning homerun.  In the 
second scenario the manager chooses to pitch to the batter and he hits a homerun.  Which 
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loss would feel worse to the manager?  Will the manager’s initial decision be biased to 
decrease the pain associated with one type of losing over another?   
The problem with this question is inherent in the circular logic.  In the above 
example, using the case where the best hitter produced the homerun, the managers might 
be upset at themselves as they should have known better and gone with the rational 
decision.  However, in the case where the worst hitter produced the homerun, the 
manager might be upset that his team allowed the worst hitter to beat them, realizing that 
it was a fluke scenario.  In this scenario, would the manager be better off being beaten by 
talent or by luck? 
With respect to baseball, I would argue that the manager would intentionally walk 
the stronger hitter, as the core issue is attribution of blame.  In the initial scenario (luck), 
the attribution is external and lays blame on the pitcher who was unable to retire a weak 
batter or to the luck of the batter.  In the latter scenario (talent), the expectation on the 
batter is high and therefore the attribution would be internal.  The manager was aware of 
the batter's ability and chose to ignore it, thus calling his own decision-making ability 
into question.  
 
6.6 Incentive Bias/Agency Problem 
As of 2004, George Steinbrenner had owned the New York Yankees for 29 years.  
Over that period the Yankees had 21 different managers.  In 1977, the Texas Rangers 
became the first team to have four different managers in the same season.  For this 
reason, the office of a major-league baseball manager has often been compared to a 
‘revolving door’ due to the tremendous number of hiring and firings that occur each 
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season.  Although it is ultimately the players that must perform in a game situation, it is 
the managers that receive the bulk of the criticism.  Ownership often argue that, while it 
is their responsibility to build the initial network of players, it is the responsibility of the 
manager to get the most out of those players through preparation, motivation and 
strategic play-calling.  Managers are ultimately responsible to the general manager and 
club ownership for the results of their team’s performance.  This situation is at the heart 
of the agency problem, with the manager acting as the agent to the club’s ownership (the 
principle).   
I hypothesize that the nature of this relationship leads to an incentive bias that 
may propel a manager to act against the objective norm and act, not in the best interest of 
the team, but in their own personal self-interest. 
This follows from a paper written in by Eisenhardt (1989) that states that "the 
agency problem arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict 
and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually 
doing" (page 58).  In the case of professional baseball, both the ownership and manager 
are focused on the overall objective of winning.  However, it is often argued that while 
the team owners is focused on short-term success, the manager should be more focused 
on building long-term success.  This may play out in a situation where a manager is 
willing to continue with a struggling pitcher to build that player’s confidence, whereas 
the owners would prefer the manager to act in the best interest of the game at hand. 
Secondly, as there is no communication between a manager and the owners 
during a particular game, owners may not be able to understand the inherent logic built 
into the manager’s strategy.   Similarly, hindsight may affect the agency problem, since 
 57
the owner will chose to assign blame as opposed to admit defeat.  Related to the 
confirmation and availability bias, owners will voluntarily seek out information to 
confirm their hypothesis that the manager’s decisions were poor in order to support their 
original hindsight bias. 
Finally, as Major League Baseball is built around one-on-one, head-to-head, 
pitcher-to-batter confrontations utilizing the world’s top professional baseball players, 
there is no guarantee of offensive success even if the manager’s strategy is perfect.  Over 
the past 65 years, only one hitter has been able to hit safely in over 40% of their at-bats 
over the course of a single season.  Ted Williams’ remarkable batting average of .407 in 
1941 still renders a 59% chance of failure.  Ownership often overlooks the opposing 
team’s caliber of players and the objective likelihoods of success when passing judgment 
on the manager. 
Given the presence of the agency problem, and given the overzealous owners who 
seem to keep their finger of the proverbial ‘fire manager’ button, there is an obvious 
incentive for a manager to act in their own best interest.  Managers may be inclined to 
direct their players in a manner that spotlights the success and failures of the players and 
de-emphasizes the manager’s own contributions.  With respect to the intentional base-on-
ball, managers may feel inclined to walk a particular batter in a situation where they 
believe pitching is the best strategy because they fear the criticism of the owners should 
their own strategy not meet with success. 
This issue is further complicated by the emergence of sports media coverage.  
Whether in newspapers, magazines, television shows or websites, commentators are 
extensively analyzing a manager’s tactics and frequently subjecting the manager to 
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unnecessary blame and scrutiny. 
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7.0 Conclusion  
The intentional base-on-ball represents an important strategic tool that provides an 
advantage to those managers who are better able to understand its importance and how 
best to use it.  Whereas existing literature supports the use of the IBB at an aggregate 
level, this paper extended that analysis to include an individual, head-to-head perspective 
utilizing data analysis techniques such as regression and simulation.   
The present study compiled data from a 25-year period and analyzed it to uncover 
key relationships between variables previously undocumented.  While the outcomes were 
statistically significant, the model was limited by the sample size (it used only batters and 
pitchers with great than 1000 at-bats or 1000 batters faced), input variables (items such as 
fielding and stadium size were disregarded) and computer applications (accuracy of 
applications).  Further analysis can be conducted extending each of these factors, thus 
creating a more complete tool. 
While the initial purpose of the model was to create a decision-making tool, 
prescribing instances in which an IBB was the preferred strategic technique, the model 
was also used to evaluate the historical use of the same technique. 
The model illustrated the overuse of the IBB by managers in accordance with the 
paper’s initial hypothesis.  The paper concluded with an introduction to the reasons for 
the overuse, described in terms of subjective biases and cognitive errors.   In this respect, 
further research can be conducted to test those reasons and determine the significance of 




The importance of this research lies in its ability to improve the decision making 
process of baseball managers and limit future Type I errors.  Through the use of this 
model, subjective biases and cognitive errors can be reduced, thus allowing managers to 




Appendix A - 24 Scenarios 
  Runners Outs 
24 Scenarios First Second Third One Two 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 1 0 
3 0 0 0 1 1 
4 1 0 0 0 0 
5 1 0 0 1 0 
6 1 0 0 1 1 
7 0 1 0 0 0 
8 0 1 0 1 0 
9 0 1 0 1 1 
10 0 0 1 0 0 
11 0 0 1 1 0 
12 0 0 1 1 1 
13 1 1 0 0 0 
14 1 1 0 1 0 
15 1 1 0 1 1 
16 1 0 1 0 0 
17 1 0 1 1 0 
18 1 0 1 1 1 
19 0 1 1 0 0 
20 0 1 1 1 0 
21 0 1 1 1 1 
22 1 1 1 0 0 
23 1 1 1 1 0 




Appendix B - Post At-Bat Scenario 
  At-Bat Outcomes 
24 Scenarios Single Double Triple Homerun Walk Out Strikeout HBP 
1 4 7 10 1 4 2 2 4 
2 5 8 11 2 5 3 3 5 
3 6 9 12 3 6 End End 6 
4 13 16 10 1 13 5 5 13 
5 14 17 11 2 14 6 6 14 
6 15 18 12 3 15 End End 15 
7 13 7 10 1 13 8 8 13 
8 14 8 11 2 14 9 9 14 
9 15 9 12 3 15 End End 15 
10 4 7 10 1 4 11 11 4 
11 5 8 11 2 5 12 12 5 
12 6 9 12 3 6 End End 6 
13 22 19 10 1 22 14 14 22 
14 23 20 11 2 23 15 15 23 
15 24 21 12 3 24 End End 24 
16 22 19 10 1 22 17 17 22 
17 23 20 11 2 23 18 18 23 
18 24 21 12 3 24 End End 24 
19 22 7 10 1 22 20 20 22 
20 23 8 11 2 23 21 21 23 
21 24 9 12 3 24 End End 24 
22 22 19 10 1 22 23 23 22 
23 23 20 11 2 23 24 24 23 
24 24 21 12 3 24 End End 24 





Appendix C – Single with Runner on Second 
  Runner Destination - Percent  
Fielder # of hits Out Second Third Home Bases/hit 
N/A 1052 1.5% 2.9% 41.5% 54.1% 1.51 
LF 5117 4.5% 0.2% 26.9% 68.4% 1.68 
CF 5476 2.4% 0.1% 14.8% 82.6% 1.82 
RF 4374 4.3% 0.0% 23.9% 71.7% 1.72 
INF 2380 4.2% 7.3% 76.6% 12.0% 1.05 
Total 18399 3.6% 1.2% 29.9% 65.3% 1.64 
 
Appendix D – Double with Runner on First 
  Runner Destination - Percent  
Fielder # of hits Out Second Third Home Bases/hit 
N/A 673 1.5%  50.8% 47.7% 2.46 
LF 3118 2.6%  56.9% 40.5% 2.38 
CF 1160 4.6%  36.8% 58.6% 2.54 
RF 2021 3.6%  58.8% 37.7% 2.34 
INF 25 8.0%  80.0% 12.0% 2.04 
Total 6997 3.1%  53.6% 43.3% 2.40 
 
Appendix E – Single with Runner on Third 
  Runner Destination - Percent  
Fielder # of hits Out Second Third Home Bases/hit 
N/A 541 0.2%  2.2% 97.6% 0.98 
LF 2840 0.1%  0.0% 99.9% 1.00 
CF 3080 0.1%  0.0% 99.9% 1.00 
RF 2566 0.1%  0.0% 99.9% 1.00 
INF 1106 0.4%  7.2% 92.4% 0.92 
Total 10133 0.1%  0.9% 99.0% 0.99 
 
Appendix F – Double with Runner on Second 
  Runner Destination - Percent  
Fielder # of hits Out Second Third Home Bases/hit 
N/A 399 0.0%  1.5% 98.5% 1.98 
LF 1975 0.2%  0.7% 99.2% 1.99 
CF 772 0.1%  1.6% 98.3% 1.98 
RF 1317 0.2%  2.4% 97.5% 1.97 
INF 18 0.0%  11.1% 88.9% 1.89 




Appendix G -  Lead Runner Destination/Outcome Chart 
At-Bat Outcomes Probability 
24 Scenarios Single Double Single Double 
4 13 19 65.2% 53.6% 
  16 7 31.3% 43.3% 
  5 8 2.1% 3.1% 
  4   1.4% 0.0% 
5 14 20 65.2% 53.6% 
  17 8 31.3% 43.3% 
  5 9 2.1% 3.1% 
  6   1.4% 0.0% 
6 15 21 65.2% 53.6% 
  18 9 31.3% 43.3% 
  6 End 2.1% 3.1% 
  End   1.4% 0.0% 
7 4 7 65.4% 100.0% 
  16  29.9% 0.0% 
  5  3.6% 0.0% 
  13   1.2% 0.0% 
8 5 8 65.3% 100.0% 
  17  30.9% 0.0% 
  6  2.6% 0.0% 
  14   1.2% 0.0% 
9 6 9 65.3% 100.0% 
  18  30.9% 0.0% 
  End  2.6% 0.0% 
  15   1.3% 0.0% 
13 13 19 65.7% 100.0% 
  22  30.3% 0.0% 
  14   4.0% 0.0% 
14 14 20 65.7% 100.0% 
  23  30.3% 0.0% 
  15   4.0% 0.0% 
15 15 21 65.7% 100.0% 
  24  30.3% 0.0% 




Appendix H: Number of Outs 
  At-Bat Outcomes, Outs 
24 Scenarios Single Double Triple Homerun Walk Out Strikeout HBP 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
5 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
6 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
7 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
8 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
9 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
10 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
11 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
12 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
13 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
14 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
15 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
16 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
17 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
18 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
19 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
20 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
21 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
22 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
23 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 




Appendix I - Number of Runs Scored 
  At-Bat Outcomes: Runs Scored 
24 
Scenarios Single Double Triple HomerunWalk Out Strikeout HBP 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
7 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
8 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
9 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
10 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 
11 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 
12 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 
13 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 
14 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 
15 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 
16 1 1 2 3 1 0 0 1 
17 1 1 2 3 1 0 0 1 
18 1 1 2 3 1 0 0 1 
19 1 2 2 3 1 0 0 1 
20 1 2 2 3 1 0 0 1 
21 1 2 2 3 1 0 0 1 
22 1 2 3 4 1 0 0 1 
23 1 2 3 4 1 0 0 1 
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